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Despite huge public sector deficits, Egypt has escaped high
inflation by depleting three nonrecoverable assets:  creditwor-
thiness,  money  illusion,  and  enforceable  foreign-exchange
controls. Without a tough reform program, the country will soon
be in a serious crisis.
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Egypt has been able to escape high inflation by  a demanding prescription; political and social
depleting its stocks of creditworthiness, money  pressure can become intolerable under adjust-
illusion, and enforceable foreign-exchange  ment.  But Giugale and Dinh show that both a
controls.  These nonrecoverable assets are  slowdown in output and the initial rise in infla-
quickly becoming extinct and the economy is on  tior associated with a tough reform program will
an unsustainable path.  be short-lived (between one and two years).
Giugale and Dinh present a short- and  And a do-nothing strategy will soon push the
medium-term dynamic model of the Egyptian  country into a serious crisis, the correction of
economy and use it to simulate the effects on  which will certainly be more painful.  Among
output and inflation of a stabilization-cum-  other things, Egypt depends on basic imports
adjustment program.  such as food.
Their conclusion:  make the public sector
live within its means, and do so at once. This is
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Egypt's current economic problems are  quite typical of  many developing
countries.  A dominant  public  role in key productive  sectors  and an array  of
administered  prices  (energy,  credit,  foreign  currency,  and  the  like)  twist  the
system of  private incentives against the  efficient use  of  comparative
advantages,  while output growth is based on  fast-growing,  trade-impairing
domestic  absorption.  That  set-up  is  enforced  through  deep  public  sector  deficits
financed  with a combination  of foreign  and domestic  borrowing  and inflation
taxation  in the  context  of repressed  financial  markets.
Naturally,  that  growth  model  has  one  serious  dynamic  flaw.  Barring  new  resources
discoveries,  the country eventually  becomes unable to honor its  foreign
commitments  (as not  enough loans get allocated to relatively  profitable
investment)  and,  so,  external  financing  of the  public  sector's  deficit  becomes
impossible.  The  government  then resorts more heavily to monetization  and
domestic  borrowing (rather,  delayed monetization);  that is,  to inflation
taxation.
That inflation  feeds  on itself.  On the  one  hand,  real  fiscal  revenues  fall  due
to the  time  lags  in their  collection  (the  so-called  Olivera-Tanzi  effect)  and,
on the  other,  domestic  money  demand  shrinks,  reducing  the  base on which the
inflation  tax in imposed.  In the end, the money-inflation  circle spirals
upwards,  calling  for  tough  stabilization  programs.
There  is,  however,  one  major  difference  in  the  recent  evolution  of the  Egyptian
system  respect  to other  developing  countries.  Although  the  voluntary  flow of
foreign  financing  has effectively  stopped,  and  no enough  fiscal  adjustment  has
been  carried  out, the  economy  remains  at a (relatively)  low  level  of inflation
(even  after  taking  into  account  the  intractable  difficulty  of  measuring  domestic
prices  in  a controlled  economy  like  Egypt).  In other  words,  so far, Egypt  has
managed  to  monetize  huge  fiscal  deficits,  with  little  impact  on  price  stability.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to address  the  mechanism  through  which  that  low-
inflation  outcome  has  been  achieved,  assess  its  sustainability,  and  propose  and
simulate  an  alternative  model  for  stability  and  growth.  We begin  by describing
the  actual  linkages  between  Egypt's  fiscal,  monetary  and  debt  policies,  as  well
as their impact  on inflation,  tracing their  evolution  over the last decade
(Section  I). It  will  be shown  that  the  Egyptian  system  is  de  facto  based  on the
depletion  of three  assets:  creditworthiness,  money illusion,  and enforceable
foreign  exchange  controls. To the  extent  that  those  are  non-recoverable  goods,
it  will  be argued  that  the  economy  is  currently  in  an unsustainable  path.
In Section  II,  we formally  present  a short-&-medium-term,  dynamic  model  of the
Egyptian  econumy,  and  we use  it to  simulate  the  effects  of an (IMF-World  Bank-
type)  adjustment  program  on  output  and  inflation.  It  will  then  become  clear  that
a  combination of  initially-tough  fiscal adjustment and  sound  monetary
programming  could  put the  country  back in a path  of growth  and  stability  and,2-
more importantly,  could  do so in a relatively  short  period  of time.  A detailed
quantification  of deficit  and money targets  compatible  with that outcome  is
provided.
In  the  conclusions,  we  address  the  underlying  implications  (and  recommendations)
for  policy  making.- 3  -
I.  Fiscal  and  Monetary  Policy,  or  How  has.Egvpt  so far  escaped  High Inflation?
By all means, Egypt's public sector'  deficit is huge. Although no  truly
consolidated  accounts  are  available  for  the  whole  public  sector,  the  best  proxy
for  it are the so-called  "Central  Government  Finances",  which include  results
from  Local  Governments,  Public  Service  Authorities,  Net Profit  Trznsfers  from
Public Sector Companies, and the Investment  budget of all  Public Sector
Enterprises.
In simple  cash terms,  those  accounts  show  an overall  deficit  of around  20Z  of
GDP during the 80s. This is roughly  twice the size of the public sector's
deficit  in  Argentina,  an  undisputed  front-runner  among  high-inflation  countries
in that  period.  (Charts  I and  II).
Of course,  the "operational"  version  of the  public  sector  deficit  is a more
accurate  measure  of its  implied  burden  on the  economy.  If  agents  do  not suffer
from money illusion,  they will make their portfolio and saving decisions
according  to the (expected)  real interest  rate that they receive from the
government  debt,  not  to  the  nominal  rate 2. In  that  sense,  the  computation  of  the
deficit  should  take  into  account  real  interest  payments,  not  nominal  ones.  This
is  precisely  the  essence  of the  operational  definition  of  deficit 3. As long  as
agents  are  rational,  the  usual  cash  deficit  over  GDP  measure  overestimates  the
real  impact  of the  public  sector's  results.
Using average  nominal  interest  rates  on government  domestic  debt 4, and actual
inflation  rates,  we have computed  an estimate  of the operational  deficit  of
Egypt's  "Central  Government  Finances"  (which,  as  explained  above  includes  other
V/  In the  context  of Egypt,  the  public  sector  includes  the  Central  Government,
Local  Governments,  the  Public  Sector  Companies  and  the (Service  and  Economic)
Public  Authorities.  The  Public  Economic  Authorities  and  the  Public  Sector
Companies  are  jointly  referred  to as Public  Enterprises.  In  this  paper,
"public  sector"  is  broadly  defired  to include  every  institution  whose  overall
deficit  is or  may  be financed,  directly  or indirectly,  through  money  creation
(i.e.  seignorage  and/or  inflation  tax).
21  Equivalently,  agents  will foresee  the  inflation-pushed  dilution  in :he  real
value  of the  government  debt.
2/  For  a  more comprehensive  treatment  of the  operational  concept,  see  Tanzi
et.al.  (1987).
A/  The  Central  and  Local  Government  held  between  70  and  951  of the  total
public  sector's  net liabilities  with the  dome-tic  banking  system  over  the
1980s.- 4 -
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portions  of the  public  sector)'.  (Chart  III).  Interestingly,  as  percentages  of
GDP, the operational  deficit  in Egypt Is still bigger than the simple  cash
deficit  In  high-inflation  Argentina  (t)  (with  exception  of 1989,  a year  of an
abnormal  jump in the  Central  Bank  of Argentina's  quasi-fiscal  deficit;  if the
latter  were  excluded  the  overall  cash  deficit  would  be about  7%  of  GDP  in  1989).
One  would  expect  that  such  high  budget  deficits  would  over time  lead  to  higher
inflat.on  levels,  as the  non-inflationary  means  of financing  quickly  disappear
and private  agents  run down on their  domestic  cash balances  (contracting  the
base for  the  inflation-tax).  However,  inflation  has  been rather  mild in  Egypt.
Between  1981  and 1985,  the  annual  rate  of change  in the consumer  price index
averaged  about  14% ,  and  has  since  then  hovered  between  18  and 23%.
In  brief,  there  is  enough  evidence  to  say  that  Egypt's  public  sector  performance
is  suitable  to  lead  the  economy  into  high-inflation  (to  say  the  least).  Judging
by developing  countries'  inflation  standards,  that  has  not  happened,  yet.
Naturally,  the  answer  lies  on the  way  the  public  sector  deficits  are  financed;
as long  as  present  and  future  monetization  can  be credibly  avoided,  there  is  no
room for permanent  inflation.  For instance,  a guaranteed,  continuous  flow  of
foreign  grants  would,  ceteris  paribus,  suffice  to  cover  an  equivalent  permanent
deficit,  without  inflation.  Notice  that  resorting  to  debt (foreign  or domestic)
only  delays  monetization  (or  fiscal  adjustment);  in the  event,  rational  agents
might  discount  future  money  printing  and,  so,  adjust  prices  immediately 8.
In  the  case  of Egypt,  public  sector  deficits  have  been  monetized  only  partially
during  the  80s.  Roughly,  half of the  financing  has come from  domestic  non-CBE
borrowing,  one-fourth  from foreign  credit,  and the rest from  money printing.
(Chart  IV). As mentioned  above, inflation  has remarkably  fluctuated  around
"only" 20%. There has  been, however, an  underlying,  particularly large
inflation-tax  base  from  which  the  government  collected  substantial  revenues.  In
the following  subsection,  we will argue  that such a large  base has been the
backbone  of Egypt's  fortunate  high-deficit-&-low-inflation  outcome.
i)  Domestic  Debt  and  Inflation  Taxation:
By all  accounts,  that  20%  inflation  tax  rate looks  small.  Moreover,  one  would
expect inflation  to spiral  upwards in the  long run, as further domestic
borrowing  becomes  more expensive  in  nominal  terms  (perhaps,  also in real  ones
5/  By  necessity,  these  are  rough  estimates.  A more accurate  computation  would
require  detailed  information  on domestic  and foreign  debt arrangements
(maturities,  expected  real  interests  rates,  dates  of floatation  within  the
year,  the  effective  exchange  rate  system  for  local  agents,  etc)  which  are  not
readily  available.
§/ This is Sargent  and  Wallace's  (1982)  "unpleasant  arithmetic"  argument.-7-
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as the government  becomes a riskier  borrower).  This has obviously  not yet
happened,  and the reason  has to do with the particular  arrangements  of the
government's  domestic  debt: it has systematically  pay negative  ex-ante  real
Interest  rates  (Chart  V). In other  words,  its  real  value  has been diluted  by
inflation.
Effectively,  then,  the  inflation  tax  base  has  been  particularly  large,  as it  has
not  only  included  money  but government  domestic  debt  papers  too.  Consequently,
the  marginal  revenue  from  the inflation  tax  has been big enough  to avoid  the
need  for  high inflation  tax  rates.
It is  important  to emphasize that that fortunate large-base-cum-low-rate
scenario  hias  been  sustainable  only  because  er-ante  real  interests  were  negative.
That  is,  for  some  reason,  there  have  been  investors  willing  (or  obliged)  to  let
their  real  wealth  dilute.  Otherwise,  they  would  have demanded  nominal  rates  of
return  big  enough  to  compensate  for  their  inflation  expectations  over  the  bonds'
maturity.  This would have caused higher  nomin  i deficits  aga, so (ceteris
paribus),  higher  monetization  and inflation. 7
Naturally,  from the  ex-post  real interest  rate  series  (as  plotted  in Chart  V)
we cannot univocally  infer the behavior  of the er-ante (or expected)  one;
expectations  are  not  dil-ectly  observable.  Optimally,  more  sophisticated  proxies
for  expected  inflation  could  be used (ARIMA  fittings,  instrumental  variables
estimation  of broadly  defined  equations,  inverted  money demand  models,  etc).
Lowever,  the sheer  magnitude  and  persistence  of the  negativity  of those  real
rates  make it  difficult  to  believe  that  it  is entirely  due to forecast  errors.
(Even  rough  survey  evidence  shows  that  Egyptian  agents  know before-hand  that
government  debt  papers  pay  negative  real  returns).
But, if the  public  sector  has indeed  been able to collect  huge inflation  tax
revenues  through  the  dilution  in the  real  value  of its  debt,  questions  arise  as
to  who holds  that  debt,  and  why. Traditionally,  domestit  public  debt  has been
sold  exclusively  to local  banks  and to  the  Central  Bank  of Egypt  (CBE)  (not  to
individuals).  The former  have the  option  to rediscount  it at the  CBE up to a
maximum;  they systematically  (and  immediately)  excersice  this optic-.,  giving
further  indication  that  the  ex-ante  real  return  on that  debt is  not appealing
(to  say the  least).  Nevertheless,  and  through  various  enforcement  mechanisms,
a quarter  of the  domestic  public  net  debt  remains  outside  the  CBE. (Chart  VI).
In principle,  it is  not very surprising  that  CBE  has been able to afford  the
7/  Of course,  it  could  be argued  that  the  government  may  have  unexpectedly
accelerated  inflation  after  floating  its  debt  and,  so,  may  have raised
inflation  tax  revenues  from  already-locked-up  investors.  However,  that  is not
a  very appealing  explanation.  It  implies  that  over (at  least)  a decade  the
authorities  were  able  to deceive  private  agents  without  serious  loss  of
credibility  and,  hence,  without  the  need  to resort  to  higher  and  higher
inflation  surprises.- 10  -
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dilution  of its  own  holdings  of public  debt.  After  all, it  can finance  itself
either by monopolistic  profits on  its foreign currency trading,  by non-
remunerated  reserve  requirements,  by simplemonetization,  or  by a mix  of them.
(In  the  event,  decapitalization  may also  occur).
More interestingly,  the  (non-Central)  banking  system  has  also  managed  to dodge
the  wealth  loss  associated  to  its  holdings  of domestic  public  debt.  Had  it  not,
it  would  probably  be out  of  business  by  now,  given  the  magnitudes  involved  (i.e.
the deep negativity  of the real returns).  Instead,  banks  have simply  passed
through that burden onto their depositors, by also  paying  them  negatlve,  ex-
ante  real  interest  rates.  (Chart VII). In other words, those depositors have
systematically  accepted  (voluntarily  or  not)  the  real  dilution  of their  wealth.
By end FY89,  private  agents  held domestic-currency  demand  and time deposits
worth  L.E.18  billion,  equivalent  to more than  100% the  then-outstanding  money
base,  even after  some  portfolio  shifting  towards  foreign  currency  denominated
assets  (discussed  below)  had taken  place.
In that  context,  it is clear  that  huge  public  sector  deficits  can  be financed
without  much inflation;  each percentage  point of inflation  dilutes  the real
value  of both  money  base and  of domestic-currency  deposits,  rendering  sizable
revenues.  In  a  rational,  frictionless  situation  that  could  hardly  happen;  savers
would  not put their  money in deposits  if they  knew  before-hand  that the  real
value  of  principal-plus-interests  upon  withdrawal  would  turn  out  to  be lower  (in
the  Egyptian  case,  much  lower)  than  the  real  value  of their  initial  investment.
Simple  stocking  of durable goods,  like gold, would be more profitable  and
equally  risky  (i.e.  riskless).  The very contraction  in the supply  of deposit
money  would  eventually  drive  nominal  interest  rates  up to positive,  expected
real  levels.
In other  words, it seems that private investors  irrationality  and/or  market
imperfections  (see  below)  have supplied  Egypt  with a large  inflation-tax  base
from  which  it  draws  (via  the  banking  system)  a key  portion  of the  financing  of
its  deficit-ridden  public  sector.  Effectively,  those  rigidities  have  saved  Egypt
from the  hardships  of high inflation.  It is crucial,  then,  to understand  the
nature  of the  rigidities  in  order  to assess  the  sustainability  the  model.
Why does a saver put part of his/her wealth in an asset that he/she can
rationally  expect  will  loose  value? Why  do  Egyptian  depositors  accept  ex-ante,
negative  real interest  rates?  One simple  answer  reads:  those  agents  are  not
rational  in  the  first  place,  they  suffer  from  some  degree  of  money-illusion,  and
do  not fully  understand  the  real  implications  of inflation.  Although  we cannot
discard  this  argument  outright,  it  has  some  weaknesses.  First,  those  depositors
are  not homogeneous  in  terms of  information;  both  presumably-uninformed
individual  savers and professional  corporate  managers  attend the Egyptian
deposit  market.  Second,  the  deep  negativity  of real  interest  rates  on deposits
has  been  operative  for  at least  a  decade;  by  now,  the  real  loss  of  wealth  should
have supplied  savers  with a reasonable  understanding  of the consequences  of
inflation.  If irrationality  is  the  explanation  behind  Egypt's  huge inflation-
tax  base,  the  system's  stability  cannot  be taken  for  granted:  sooner  or latter,
persistent-and-increasing  inflation  will drive people away from domestic-- 13  -
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currency  deposits,  leaving  the  banking  system  alone,  and possibly  unable  to
cope,  with  the  burden  of the  under-performing  public  sector  debt.
Another  possible  explanation  for the  agents'  acceptance  of negative,  ex-ante
real interest  rates is the simple lack of alternatives.  What else can an
Egyptian  saver  do with  his/her  savings? The  most obvious  option  is to switch
to  foreign-currency  denominated  assets.  This is  not legally  possible  in Egypt.
The  foreign  exchange  regime  is  an  asymmetric,  non-market,  administered-exchange-
rate  system:  all  legal  transactions  must  be made at  one of the  official  rates,
either  at the Central Bank or at a network of officially-appointed  banks;
foreign  currency  can  be sold  there  (at  the  corresponding  fixed  rate)  but  can  be
bought  only for international  trading  purposes,  on a discretionary  rationing
basis.  Effectively,  then,  holders  of domestic  currency  cannot  legally  convert
it into  foreign  one.  There  is a forex  black  market  but it is  heavily  policed,
and  penalties  for dealing  in it are  severe.  This leaves  the stocking  of real
goods  as the  only  viable  alternative  to  domestic-currency  deposits.  The  problem
is that those  goods  are, in general,  not very liquid  and/or  costly  to store
safely.  Notably,  there  exist  very  active  markets  for  jewelry  in  Egypt  (specially
gold) but secure  storage costs may be proportionally  too big for a small
investor  .3
There  is,  however,  one  major  handicap  in  the  previous  argument.  It  implies  that
Egypt's  large inflation-tax  base is due to the effective  policing (rather,
suppression)  of  its  black  forex  market.  This  trapped  domestic  savers  into  real-
loss-making  deposits, indirectly  helping to  finance large public sector
deficits.  The  problem  is that  tough  policing  of that  black  market  only  started
after  1987 (year  of Egypt's  Paris  Club  agreement)  when an official  commercial
bank rate  was established.  Prior  to that  year, there  had been (de facto)  no
suppression  of  the  black  foreign  exchange  market.  In  other  words,  the  conversion
towards  foreign  currency  was  an available  option  during  most  of the  1980s  and,
yet, negative  ex-ante  real interest  rates  were operative.  Also, even for the
current  foreign  exchange  controls,  the  economic  incentives  from  dealing  in the
black  forex  market  are  huge;  assuming  that the  exchange  rate  there  follows  an
exact purchasing  parity power,  and that there is no inflation  abroad, the
maximum  value  of the  percentage  bid-ask  spread  acceptable  by customer  would  be
equal  to  the  absolute  value  of  the  real  interest  rates  on deposits,  around  lOX.
This  should  be appealing  enough  for  prospective  dealers  to  keep  doing  business.
§/  Some  extra  evidence  for  the  "no-alternatives"  argument  is given  by the
creation  and  rapid  expansion  of the  so-called  "Islamic  Investment  Companies"
during  1987-88.  These  institutions,  effectively,  managed  to offer  deposits  at
positive  real  interest  (or  "dividend")  rates;  that  is,  their  legal  position
allowed  them  to  dodge  the  nominal  interest  rate  ceilings  prevailing  at that
time  in the  rest  of the  banking  system.  It is  not surprising,  then,  that  the
Islamic  Companies'  domestic-currency  deposits  grew  by about  LE 4  billion  (as
compared  to the  LE 15  billion  money  base  outstanding  at the  end  of June 1988)
in  just a  couple  of years.  (A  religion-base  argument  could  be put forth  to
explain  the  appeal  of the  Islamic  Companies;  however,  their  deposit  account
were  open to,  and  used  by, the  general  public).- 15 -
Overall, there seems to be no  clear-cut explanation  for  the holding of
underperforming  domestic-currency  deposits  by Egyptian  savers. Some mix of
"mild"  money illusion  (specially,  at the beginning  of the 80s) and foreign
exchange  market  repression  (intensified  later  on) looks  the  most  likely  cause.
From the policy sustainability  point of view, the system  is, anyhow,  weak.
Inflation  may have yet  not surpassed  a critical  threshold  beyond  which real-
value losses  and/or  arbitrage  profits  become too big to be ignored.  In the
event, savers will no longer accept the on-going  nominal interest  rates,
withdrawing  their  implicit  support  for  the  banking  system  which,  in  turn,  will
not  be able  to afford  its  holding  of public  debt.  In the  end, the  government
will  have to  accelerate  inflation  (possibly,  in  an spiral  fashion)  in  order  to
raise  the  same  inflation-tax  revenue  on a  now-shrinking  base.
ii)  Foreign  Financing:
Net foreign  credit  has  played  a major  role in the financing  of public  sector
deficits  in Egypt  during  almost  all  the 80s.  It has taken  the form  of grants,
project  loans,  defense-expenditure  credits,  and the  like.  After  a  peak in 1988
(following  the  1987  Paris  Club  Agreement),  net foreign  inflows  appear  to  have
been  sharply  reduced  during  1989  (while  debt  service  payments  rose).  The  country
now  lacks creditworthiness,  and  there is  little prospect of  significant
(unconditional)  capital  injections  in the  near future.
As a consequence  of that  fall  in  foreign  help,  public  sector  financing  through
the  Centrai  Bank  of  Egypt  has  more  than  doubled  over  1989.  This,  remarkably,  did
not  mean  a shadow  increase  in  money  base.  Chart  VIII shows  that  the  difference
between  the  change  in  net credit  to the  public  sector  and the  change  in money
base  has increased  by more than  50%  over  FY89.  In other  words,  the  authorities
have somehow  sterilized  the monetary  effects  of the contraction  in foreign
financing of  the  public sector deficit, without adjusting the  latter.
Effectively, they succeeded in  avoiding both high  inflation and  riscal
discipline,  in  front  of  the  adverse  international  credit  situation.  As  explained
below,  this  is  by no means  sustainable  in  the  medium  run.
The  mechanism  through  which  that  goal  was  accomplished  is  the  so-called  "blocked
account",  set  up in  March  1987.  Under  this  arrangement,  public  enterprises  and
authorities  which  are due  to pay  foreign  debt services  (87%  of Egypt's  US$ 52
billion  outstanding  foreign  debt  is  public  and/or  publicly  guaranteed)  pay  them
in  domestic  currency  to the Central Bank, at an administered,  overvalued
exchange  rate.  In other  words,  the  Central  Bank  buys  up those  firms's  foreign
debt  (at  a loss),  depleting  its  net foreign  assets.  As the  Bank,  then,  does  not
necessarily  service  its now-bigger  foreign liabilities  there is no further
monetary  expansion  (in  order  to buy the  foreign  currency  that  would  be needed
to pay abroad).  In terms  of the Central  Bank balance sheet,  this  mechanism
amounts  to a simple  swap of assets:  an increase  in net "Claims  on the public
Sector"  is compensated  with a fall in  net "Foreign  Assets".  Or, seen from  the
liabilities  side,  the  expansion  in  money  base due  to the  extra  financing  given- 16  -
Chart  VIII
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to  the  public sector is reabsorbed  by  collecting the  domestic-currency
"equivalent"  of the foreign  debt service  from local  debtor  institutions,  and
then retaining  the corresponding  payments  abroad.  Of course, the key of the
system  is the  accumulation  of foreign  arrears  by the  Central  Bank.  In effect,
Egypt  has  so far  dodged  much of  the  contrac  :ion  in  net  foreign  financing  of its
public  sector  deficit  by reducing  (formally,  delaying  with no explicit  time
limit)  the  service  of its  foreign  debt.
It is clear  that the "blocked  account"  mechanism  can delay  money and,  hence,
inflation  expansion  only for  a while.  At some  point,  arrears  accumulation  and
total  loss  of creditworthiness  will stop the  gross  flow  of foreign  currency,
triggering  a foreign  exchange  crlsis'.  This, in itself,  will be particularly
harmful  for  a country  highly  dependent  on imports  of  basic  goods  (most  notably,
foodstuff).  But more importantly,  such a crisis  will directly  compromise  the
solvency  of the  Central  Bank, as the  blocked  account  is actually  a negative,
foreign-currency  denominated  position. Specifically,  the  blocked account
increased  eight-fold  since  its  creation  in  March  1987 (Chart  IX);  by end  FY89,
it  amounted  to almost  ten  times  the  capital  of the  Central  Bank,  and about  9Z
of the  country's  foreign  debt.  Clearly,  that  is  too  much  foreign  risk  exposure.
iii)  Avoiding  high inflation:  Summary.
During the 80s, Egypt has managed to have huge public  sector deficits  and
relatively  very-low  inflation.  This has been achieved  by a combination  of a
large  inflation-tax  base  and  substantial  foreign  financing  (voluntary  and  non-
voluntary).  Both  sources  are  extinguishing,  quickly.
On the  one  hand,  there  are  clear  signs  that  a process  of currency  substitution
away from domestic  money has begun, in spite  of the authorities  repression
efforts  over the black foreign  exchange  market.  The proportion  of foreign-
currency  denominated  (demand  and time)  deposits  in private sector  liquidity
holdings  has been growing  steadily  over  the last five  years.  (Chart  X).  And
this  process is  unlikely to  reverse itself without major  changes in
fundamentals;  namely,  without fiscal corrections.  Muddling-through  type of
solutions  will  not  work,  both  because  money-illusion  is  a  non-recoverable  asset
and  because  there  is  a limit  to  the  police  grip  that  can  be applied  to informal
markets.
On the  other  hand,  the  country  is  depleting  its  creditworthiness  through  arrears
accumulation  in order to cover the contraction  in gross foreign financing,
viciously  speeding  up that contraction.  The Central  Bank of Egypt's  arrear
building,  meant  to  avoid  the  inflationary  impact  of large  money-financed  public
sector  deficits,  cannot  be sustained  for  long.  Baring  an  immediate,  major  fiscal
91  Egypt's  inability  to  meet the  so-called  "Brooke  Amendment"  (i.e.  service
existing  US Government  debts  in  order  to  qualify  for  further  disbursements  of
US official  financial  aid)  may  just  trigger  that  external  crisis.- 18  -
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overhaul  or an extraordinary  foreign  aid package,  huge money expansions  are
inevitable  in the  near future.  And inflation  will follow  suit.  In the  peak of
the  crisis,  there  will  be  no solution  but  to.adJust  the  public  sector  accounts.
In the  end,  the  delay  will  prove  to  be useless,  and  the  adjustment  will  be more
painful  for  the  Egyptian  people.- 21  -
II.  Adiustment.  Stability  and  Growth:  A  Policy  Package  for  Egypt.
Is it  possible  to  achieve  stability  and  growth  in  Egypt? Can  an IMF-World  Bank
adjustment  package  succeed? What  are  the  necessary  fiscal  and  monetary  target
paths?  How should  public  sector  deficits  be financed? What will happen to
inflation?  Given  the  several  policy-imposed,  nominal  rigidities  in  the  Egyptian
economy,  what would be output's reaction?  Is it possible to keep those
rigidities?
It is the  purpose  of this  section  to  provide  an answer  to these  questions.
For that,  we set up a simple,  dynamic  model of the Egyptian  economy.  Using
current  starting  values,  we look  for  the  deficit  and  money  creation  levels  that,
coupled with an  IMF-WB-type  policy package (devaluation,  interest rates
increases,  and  the  like),  can  bring  about  (permanent)  low  inflation  and  output
recovery.  It  should  be emphasized  at the  outset  that  our  model  is  not  meant  to
be a  general  piece  of  macroeconomic  theory;  it  rather  tries  to  give  a  practical,
operational  assessment  of the short (and  medium)  run effects  of a particular
stabilization  package  on the  Egyptian  economy.  In  that  sense,  country-specific
assumptions  and  parameters  are  given  priority  over  more  general  specifications.
v) The  Simulation  Model:
There  are two  main nominal  rigidities  that characterize  Egypt's  economy:  all
nominal  interest  rates  have  binding,  below-inflation  ceilings,  and  the  nominal
exchange  rate is artificially  fixed tnrough  a non-market  system  of exchange
controls.  This  particular  set-up  grants  a key role to inflation  expectations:
they  drive  both  real  (ex-ante)  interest  and  real  exchange  rates.  These,  in  turn,
affect  agents'  decisions  on saving,  investment,  tradable-vs-nontradable  goods
consumption,  and  the  like.
In that context, the public sector accounts  become all inmportant.  Money
financing  of fiscal  deficits  that lead  to inflation  changes  the expected  real
interest  and  exchange  rates,  altering  the real  allocation  of resources  in the
economy.  In other  words,  anticipated  nominal  changes  have real  effects  in the
presence  of nominal  rigidities.  It is clear,  then,  that the  modelling  of the
sources  of  money  creation  is  crucial  to  understand  Egypt's  economic  performance.
There  are  three  major  sources  of money  expansion  in Egypt:  the  public  sector's
deficit  financing  (best  proxied  by the  so-called  "Central  and  Local  Government"
accounts),  the  system  of foreign  exchange  controls,  and  the  servicing  of  foreign
and  domestic  debt. As explained  in  the  previous  section,  the  "blocked  account'
mechanism  is  effectively  a way to reabsorb  part  of that  money  e.c?ansion  (with
a counterpart  depletion  of the Central  Bank's  net foreign  asset position).
Hence,  the  money  creation  equation  for  our  simulation  looks  like:- 22  -
(1)  614i  - Ot pi  [TB,.,+ NISA,.]  e,  +  Of.  I  NINSFD,  +  BW,.,  ij,
+  (a,B',, - FA.,)  i',  e,.,  ]  - W  BV 0 ,  e;
1  --  e,  0,  0 2 0  a>  O
Equation  (1)  states  that  the  net  change  in  nominal  money  base  (6H)  at  any  period
"t"  will  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  three  factors.  First,  the  non-sterilized  portion
(e)  of  the  section  (A)  of  trade  balance  (TB)  and  non-interest  service  account
(NISA)  that  is  (rather,  has  to  be)  surrendered  at  the  Central  Bank  at  the
official  exchange  rate  (e*).  Second,  the  non-sterilized  portion  (0)  of  the  fiscal
deficit  monetization;  the  latter  is  composed  of  the  primary  deficit  net  of
foreign  and  social-security-related  financing  (NINSFD),  plus  the  interest  (io,.,)
on  the  outstanding  public  sector  domestic  debt  (Bt,.,),  plus  the  interest  (it,,)  on
the  outstanding  public  sector  net  foreign  debt  (B',.,  - F4,.,)  denominated  in
domestic  currency  (via  the  free  market  valuation  rate  "e")  and  actually  paid
after arrears  are  decided  (via  the  arrear  factor  "a").  Third,  the  interest
payments  on  a  portion  (0)  of  the  total  foreign  debt  at  the  beginning  of  the
simulation  is  paid  into  the  blocked  account  at  the  official  exchange  rate,
reducing  the  total  level  of  money  base'".
Assuming  that  no  further  foreign  financing  is  available,  Equation  (1)  implies
a  sister  equation  for  domestic  debt  formation  like:
(2)  SBd, - (1 - e,) At  [  TBt., +  NISAt., ]  e,  +  (1-0,)  [  NINSFDt +  Bd,., ig,  +
+  (a,B',,  - F4.,)*it*e,,J
in  other  words,  domestic  debt  will  accumulate  on  the  basis  of  the  "official"
current  account  result's  sterilization  and  of  debt  financing  of  the  total  fiscal
deficit.  In  turn,  foreign  debt  will  accumulate  according  to  the  chosen  "arrear"
factor  and  to  the  gross  disbursement  of  foreign  loans  used  to  finance  the  fiscal
accounts  (D,J,  implicit  in  our  variable  NINSFD (notice  that  our  arrear  factor  "a,"
can  be  use  to  account  for  any  amortization  of  outstanding  foreign  debts,  by
simply  setting  it  bigger  than  unity):
Q/  Equation  (1)  assumes  that  the  Central  Bank  of  Egypt  is  part  of  the  fiscal
entity;  in  other  words,  fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  deficits  are  merged  together.- 23 -
(3)  SB'  - (I  - a) Vt,.,  if,  + Dt
Naturally,  the  Central  Bank's  stock  of  foreign  assets  (FA)  will  also  accumulate,
as  it (compulsorily)  buys a  portion of the proceeds from the country's
commercial  transfers.  Algebraically,
(4)  SFA - pA  l TBt.,  + NISA,. 1]
The  newly  created money will  put  upward  pressure on  prices via  the
instantaneously-clearing  money  market. The  latter's equilibrium  will be
specified  as:
(5)  (M/P)t  - r  . y,  . exp(-a.idt)
Equation  (5)  simply  says  that  the  real  money  supply  (M/P,  "P"  being  the  domestic
price  level)  at any  time "t"  equals  the  real  demand  for  money.  This  is defined
as  a function  of  real  output  (y),  and  the  domestic,  nominal  interest  rate  (id,);
"r"  and  "a"  are  constants".  Clearly,  by log-differentiating  Equation  (5)  respect
to time,  a semi-reduced  solution  for  inflation  can  be obtained:
(6)  Xrt  - (6M 1/^,)  - (6y,/y,.,)  +  a.6id,
where  "r"  stands  for  inflation,  and  "6x"  stands  for  the  time  derivative  of any
variable  "x".  We have  already  specified  the  money-supply  creation  mechanism  in
Equation  (1), taking  into  account  the  authorities  fiscal,  financial  and  foreign
exchange  policies.  Nominal  interest  rates  will  also  be  an  exogenously-determined
policy  variable 1 2. It remains,  however,  to specify  the real output  formation
equation. We  have  chosen an  aggregate-demand-determined  mechanism. This
implicitly  assumes  a good deal of idle capacity  in the economy  and ignores
IV/  It is  possible  that,  in  a financially  repressed  economy,  the  true
opportunity  cost  of  money  holdings  is the  return  from  having  real  goods  (i.e.
expected  inflation)  ratber  than  the  return  from  an interest-bearing  security
(id). See,  for  instance,  R. Kitchen,  Finance  for  the  Developing  Countries,  J.
Wiley  & Sons,  1986,  Chapter  3.  As the  stabilization  program  to  be included  in
our simulation  envisages  a "flexibilization"  of domestic  nominal  interest
rates  (in  line  with inflation),  we have  preferred  to keep  the  latter  as the
opportunity  cost  argument  in  our  demand  for  money  equation.
j-/  Naturally,  money  supply  and  interest  rates  can  be both  exogenous  only  if
credit  market  controls  are  enforceable.- 24 -
supply-side  reactions  to  economic  policy. These  would  be  important  shortcomings
in a general-purpose  model;  however,  in the  particular  case of Egypt,  we have
clear indications  of widespread  factor.  unemployment  (for instance,  official
labor  unemployment  figures  for  FY90  are  above  10 of the  total  labor  force)  and
we do  not expect  any  significant  supply-side  recovery  during  the  first  (two  to
three)  years  of implementation  of the  stabilization-cum-adjustment  program.  In
other  words,  our  simplification  of the  output  equation  will  render  the  model's
results "short-run  (or, rough medium-run),  Egypt-specific";  this suffices,
however,  the  purpose  of our  paper.  Specifically,  output  will be determined  as
foliows:
(7)  yt  - TB,  - (e/P),  +  pa,  + gat
where  "pa"  and "ga"  stand  for  real  private  and  government  (public)  absorption,
respectively.  In  turn,  the  different  components  of the  aggregate  demand  will  be
postulated  as:
(8)  pat  - r . yt  . exp-B.  (idt  - (7r)
(9)  TBt  - n  . (e;/  e)'  . (et  /  Pt)(  V 
(10)  ga,  - exogenously  determined  in  the  fiscal  budget
where  T, B and  El  are  constants;  "jPt"  has  already  been  introduced  as the  portion
of  foreign  traders  that  have  to  surrender  their  net  proceeds  at the  Central  Bank
(at  the  unfavorable  "official"  exchange  rate).  Equation  (8) tries  to capture
both income-pushed  private  consumption  and expected-real-interest-rate-driven
investment;  together,  they  will account  for  private  absorption.  Equation  (9)
highlights  the fact that incentives  are different  for "official"  and "non-
official"  traders,  as the  latter  have their  nominal  exchange  rate  artificially
set  by the  Government  and,  in  that  sense,  are  assumed  to  look  at  the  gap  between
theirs  and the  "free"  market's  exchange  rates. 13
3/  Equation  (9)  is  mathematically  weak  as, in  general,  "TB"  can take  both
positive  or negative  values;  changes  in sign  may complicate  the interpretation
of algebraical-value  rates  of growth.  However,  the  fact  that  Egypt's  trade
balance  is  currently  (and,  for  the  matter,  has  been during  the  last  decades)
so  deeply  in  red  makes  unrealistic  to  expect  any  change  in sign (i.e.  to
positive  values)  in  the  short  and  medium  run;  hence,  we have  proceeded  with
our  particular  specification,  gaining  in  modelling  simplicity.- 25 -
Taking  rates  of growth  in (7)-(10),  and  substituting  as needed,  we can  obtain
a  semi-reduced  form equation for output growth. That resulting,  somewhat
cumbersome  equation,  which we leave for the Appendix,  can be coupled  with
Equation  (6)  (the  semi-reduced  form  for  inflation)  in  order  to  get  a  linear  two-
equation  system  where  the  endogenous  are inflation  and  real  output  growth,  and
the  exogenous  are the  policy  variables  and the  world  inflation.
To summarize,  the  exogenous  policy  decisions  relevant  to  our  model  are:
i) the size of the public  sector  deficit  effectively  financed  with money
creation;  notice  that  the  implied  debt  financing,  in  turn,  will increase  future
deficits  as it  will  eventually  require  servicing  (i.e.  debt  may  just  be delayed
monetization);
ii)  the  degree  of sterilization  of the  monetary  effects  of foreign  exchange
controls" 4;
iii)  the  levels  of arrears  on foreign  debt  service  (if  any);
iv)  the  nominal  interest  rate  ceilings,  both  for  government  debt  and  for  the
banking  system  loans  and  deposits;
v) the  level  of the  nominal  exchange  rate  at which  approved  traders  have to
surrender/buy  their  foreign  currency  at the Central  Bank (or  at its  official
dealers'  outlets);
vi) the size of the government's  expenditure  on goods and services  (i.e.
public  absorption).
Once  those  decisions  are  made,  we can find  the implied  monetary  expansion  and
domestic  and  foreign  debt accumulation.  This  will have an immediate  impact  on
inflation  via  the  money  market.  That  initial,  inflation  rate  will  drive  the  (ex-
ante) real interest  rate and the real exchange  rate.  The former  will help
determine  short-run  aggregate  demand  (mainly  through  working  capital  and  capital
investment  credit  cost);  the latter  and the world's rate of inflation  will
influence  the  country's  trade  balance.  In the  short  and medium  run,  domestic
absorption  (also  fueled  by the government  expenditure  decision)  and  the trade
balance  will  determine  output  growth,  under  the  (plausible)  assumption  that  the
Egyptian  economy  is far  from  full  employment.  In turn,  real  output  growth  will
feed  back into  the  money  market  via  the  real  demand  for  money.  Eventually,  the
system  will reach  equilibrium.  Final  output  growth  will, then,  determine  the
size of the tax  revenues  and, so,  will enter  next year's  fiscal  (and  other)
policy  decisions.  This  is the  core  mechanism  of  our  model,  as depicted  in  Chart
XI.
A complete  listing  of the  model's  equations,  starting  values  and  parameters  is
given  in  the  Appendix.  It  should  be clear  by  now, that  the  model  contains  three
key  relationships:  i)  between  the  growth  of real  money  demand  and  the  change  in
nominal  interest  rate;  ii)  between  the  change  in  real  interest  rates  (on  private
documents)  and  the  rate  of change  in  real  private  absorption;  iii)  between  the
1i4  Notice  that  there  is  no foreign  exchange  market  as such  in Egypt.  The
Central  Bank  administers  the  country's  foreign  currency  reserve  by a rationing
system.  It is  clear,  then,  that  the  result  of the  "approved"  foreign  trade  has
a direct  impact  on  money  base.Degree  of  strlaTo
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rate  of change  of the  real exchange  rate  and the  rate  of change  in the trade
balance  result.  For simplicity,  all these  relationships  have  been set linear,
limiting  the  model  (rigorous)  validity  to  the  neighborhood  of equilibrium.  The
value of the relevant  parameters  are picked from an array of simulations
performed  on past data.
v) The  Adjustment  Program:
The core of the adjustment  program  that  we will simulate  in our  model  can  be
summarized  into:
a. Unification-cum-devaluation  (to  a 3.6 LE/US$  level,  from its  current
2.68  weighted-average  value  -- the  two-tier  official  rates  are 2.71  and 2--)  of
the official  exchange  rates,  keeping  its  real  value  thereafter;  exchange  rate
controls  effectively  remain  in  place;
b. Increase  of all domestic  interest  rates ceilings  (on government  and
private  debt)  in ovier  to approach,  over  time,  positive  real  levels;  this  will
initially  raise  the (one-year-loan)  interest  rate  faced  by  private  agent  to  25X
(from  its  current  16X  level);
c. Fiscal  correction  "in  line  with"  the  other  two  measures  (see  below);
d. The  country's  reform  efforts  are  to  be supported  by some  form  of extra
foreign  financing  or debt relief.  Specifically,  a US$ 2 billion  net foreign
inflow  is envisaged  each  year (over  the  FY91 to  FY93  period).  This  will allow
the  government  to keep  the "blocked  account"  system  in  place,  at least  during
the  first  three  years  of the  program.
Our policy  package is allegedly  similar to the short-term  component  of an
adjustment  plan  currently  being  considered  by the  Egyptian  government,  with  the
support  of the IMF and the World Bank.  However,  any comparison  needs to be
treated  with caution.  First,  the government's  program is geared  to achieve
wider,  and essential,  structural  reforms  in the  Egyptian  economy  (like  trade
liberalization,  privatization,  public  sector's  efficiency  enhancement,  labor-
market  restriction  relaxations,  energy  prices'  international  realignment,  etc).
These  very  desirable  reforms  are  ignored  by our  (short-run)  model,  although  they
constitute  the  main  reason  for  the  country  to engage  in  an adjustment  program
in  the  first  place.  In  that  sense,  our  simulation  can  be seen  only  as an  effort
to trace the short-run  effects  of that adjustment  on output  and inflation.
Second,  our  starting  point  is our  preliminary  estimate  of the  Egyptian  fiscal
accounts  as of July 1990;  these  are subject  to changes,  specially  since the
budget is an issue  open to negotiation  between the Government  and the IMF.
Third,  we will assume  that  the  adjustment  program  is  put in  place  by July 1st,
1990  and,  so, covers  the  whole  FY91.  However,  the  actual  program  is likely  to
be delayed  well into  the  calendar  year 1992.
Given  those  handicaps  of our  simulation,  it is  clear  that  the  latter  should  be
interpreted  as a  framework  for  short-run  policy  assessment  rather  than  a  set  of
policy  recommendations.  a  the  event,  the  usefulness  of the  measures  undertaken- 28 -
by the  Government  will  depend  on the  actual  circumstances  of the  economy  at the
time of implementation.  If any, the merit of our model is to provide a
methodology  for the assessment  of the short-run  impact  of the adjustment  on
inflation  and  output,  independently  of  the  nature  and  timing  of that  adjustment.
vi)  Deficit,  Available  Financing  and  Deficit  Adjustments:
How much (and what type of) financing  will be available  for Egypt's  public
sector  if  the  stabilization-cum-reform  program  is  to  be  successful?  Our  answer,
projected  through  1993,  is  provided  in  Part  A of Table  1.
Firstly,  if the  country  is truly  committed  to permanently  fight  inflation,  it
needs  clear  money  expansion  targets.  A  simple  rule  proves  effective  in  our  model
(see  below):  keep  money  financing  of the  government  (and  its related  agents)
constant  in  nominal  terms  (at  L.E.  2.3  billion,  down  from  its  1990  level  of  L.E.
6.8  billion).  Optimally,  make this  rule  publicly  known;  once  the  commitment  is
made  the  eventual  loss  of reputation  may  help  avoid  the  temptation  of  unplanned
monetary  financing" 5. Moreover,  if  credible,  the  implied  expected  low-inflation
will  be reflected  in  private  contracts  too.
Secondly,  the  authorities  have traditionally  resorted  to  withdrawals  from  the
social  security  fund,  as  fast  population  growth  and  almost-guaranteed  employment
schemes  have kept it in surplus.  The adjustment  program  will probably  revert
that;  economic  activity  will slow  down (if  not  recess)  in the  short  and  medium
run  and  unemployment  will increase.  Moreover,  real  salaries  are  also likely  to
fall.  In real terms,  then,  the country's  wage bill,  to which social  security
contributions  are directly  linked,  will be flat  or falling.  It is not longer
realistic  to  assume  that  the  government  will  be  able  to  increase  its  withdrawals
from the  social  security  fund'".  To be on the  safe side,  we assume  a complete
freeze in the real financing  that the government  can get from the social
security  fund  at its  FY91's  level  (of  about  L.E. 5.6  billion).
Thirdly,  foreign financing  available  to the government  is bound to become
scarce.  Although  the  adjustment  program  will  provide  some  (initial)  debt  relief,
it is sensible  to suppose  that the  net dollar  flow of foreign  help will not
increase  thereof.  In  our  simulations,  we  have  assumed  that  net  foreign  financing
of the  government  deficit  is  to reach  US$ 2  billion  upon  the  implementation  of
1-5/  Several  papers  deal  with the  issue  of monetary  rules  versus  monetary
discretion.  See  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a,b),  Lucas  and  Stokey  (1983),  Persson,
Persson  and  Svensson  (1987).
16/ Inter-generational  and  efficiency  considerations  could  also  be put forward
to argue  against  the  public  sector  (mis)use  of social  security  funds.- 29  -
TABLE  1
SUMMARY  OF GOVERNMENT  FINANCES,  FY90  TO FY93
Part  A
1990  1991b,c  1991a,c  1992a,d  1993a,d
AVAILABLE  FINANCING  12186  20171  15171  20412  24389
Foreign  (net)  1142  7200  7200  10149  12386
whose  USS  vatue  is:  421  2000  2000  2000  2000
Domestic  11044  12971  7971  10263  12003
Nonbank  - Soc.Sec.  4200  5597  5597  7889  9629
Bank  - Monetization  6844  7374  2374  2374  2374
Part  B
1990  1991b  1991a  1992a  1993a
TOTAL  REVENUE  19454  30719  35719  50347  61449
Centrat  government  15369  26290  31290  44104  53829
Tax  Revenue  11738  18211  22211  31307  38210
Non-Tax  Revenue  3631  8079  9079  12797  15619
Local  government  985  1269  1269  1789  2183
Pubtic  service  authors.  500  737  737  1039  1268
Investment  self-financing  2600  2423  2423  3415  4168
TOTAL  EXPENDITURE  31640  50890  50890  71731  87548
Current  expenditure  20942  40404  40404  56951  69509
Wages  6000  7238  7238  10202  12452
Other  goods  and  services  2694  3622  3622  5105  6231
Defense  (domestic)  3558  7079  7079  9978  12178
Interests  3614  12751  12751  17973  21936
Subsidies  3760  8125  8125  11452  13978
Other  current  expend.  1316  1589  1589  2240  2734
Capital  expenditure  10698  10136  10136  14287  17437
Investment  10900  10113  10113  14255  17398
Net  capital  and  invs.  funds  -202  23  23  32  40
Adjustment-related  expend.  0  350  350  493  602
Overatl  balance  before  any  pass-through  -12186  -20171  -15171  -21384  -26099
Necessary  pass-through  to fit  available  finance  972  1710
FINAL  OVERALL  BALANCE  (after  pass-through)  -15171  -20412  -24389
(as  X of  GDP)  -12.24X -13.63X -15.10X
(continued)- 30  -
Memo Items:
Implied  inflation  (see  model)  40.95%  22.05%  5.68%
Implied  real  GDP  growth  -2.49%  -1.06%  2.10%
Nominal  GDP  91  O0  123972  149711  161528
Exchange  Rate  (LE  per  USS)  2.Z1  3.6  3.6  5.07  6.19
Goverrnent's  Good-8-Serv.  Expenditure  18468  22403  22403  31578  38541
Extra  Fiscal  Effort  5000
on good-&-serv.  expend.  0
on tax  revenue  *  4000
on non-tax  revenue  1000
Sources:  Egyptian  Authorities,  IMF,  World  Bank,  and  own  calculations.
Notes:  a/ After  the  EXTRA  fiscal  Effort
b/  Before  any  EXTRA  fiscal  effort
c/  Money is  endogenous
d/ Money exogenous,  nominal  subsidy  pass-through  endogenous- 31 -
the  program,  and  that  it  will  remain  constant  in  nominal  dollar  terms."
We introduce  now  another  simple  rule  that.  our simulation  will prove  effective
in terms of inflation-and-growth  (see below): keep the so-called "Overall
Government  Deficit'  equal to the available  financing  described  In the three
previous  paragraphs.  In other words, adjust  your net expenses  to meet the
available,  non-inflationary  financing  (and  not the  other  way  around!).  As  with
monetary  targets,  public  announcement  of this  rule is  desirable. The  question
is:  what  expense  cuts  and/or  tax  increases  are  needed  to  fulfill  this  objective?
Our  answer,  projected  through  1993,  is  given  in  Part  B of  Table  1.
As our starting  point,  we take  our (preliminary)  estimate  of the 1991  actual
budget".  Upon  implementation,  that  program  will  have four  major  impacts  on the
budget:  i)  the  unification  (and  increase)  of the  exchange  rates  will raise  the
costs of import-related  subsidies  (notably,  foodstuffs);  ii) the increase  in
interest  rates  will  make  credit  dearer  for  public  sector  companies;  iii)  there
will be extra outlays related to the restructuring  of the public sector
enterprises  (financial  rescues,  institutional  reforms,  and the like);  iv)  the
real  growth  in  government's  consumption  and  investment  will  fall.  Of  course,  the
government  could avoid part of those extra expenses  by, on the one hand,
passing-through  the  higher  costs  of the  (implicit  and  explicit)  subsidies  onto
the consumers (via corresponding  price adjustments)  and, on the other,  by
refusing  to help (rather,  bail-out)  public  companies  in financial  distress.' 9
However,  to  be on  the  safe  (and,  probably,  realistic)  side,  we will  assume  that
the government  will do nothing  to dodge  the extra  burden  associated  with the
1l/ Notice  that,  as explained  above,  the  so-called  "Central  and  Local
Government"  accounts  incorporate  the  investment  expenditures  of the  whole
public  sector.  Much  of the  foreign-currency  component  of these  expenditures
(imported  raw  materials,  imported  machinery,  and  the  like)  is  covered  by ear-
marked  foreign  financing  (i.e.  project  specific  loans). Consequently,  any
devaluation  of the  Egyptian  pound  increases  both the  total  domestic-currency
investment  expenditure  of the  government  and the  "below-the-line"  domestic-
currency-denominated  foreign  financing  available  for  it.  In other  words,  more
domestic  money  will  be needed  to finance  the  public  deficit  but also  more
domestic  money  will  be available  for  that  purpose.  Under  this  accounting
arrangement,  then,  the  traditional  deficit  over  GDP  ratio  is  not  very
informative  in the  presence  of exchange  rate  variations.
II/ It  should  be noted  that  this  budget  estimate  assumes  that  the  adjustment
program  (devaluation,  interest  rate  increase,  and so  on) is implemented  as of
July  1st,  1990  and,  so,  covers  the  whole  FY91.
1a/  Tn  fact,  it is  not  even  certain  that  financial  costs  for  public  sector
companies  will  be m.uch  higher.  This is  because  most (if  not  all)  of their
capital  debts  are  long-maturity,  fixed-rate  obligations.  Only the  increase  in
the  cost  of  working-capital  finance  will  have an immediate  impact  on the
public  enterprises'  performance.- 32 -
stabilization  program.
Under  those  conditions,  it  is  clear  that  -the  implied  "Overall  Deficit"  would  be
well  above  the  "Available  Financing",  bringing  the  need  for  monetization  to  L.E.
7.3  billion.(See  Table  1).  This  would  put  our  monetary  programing  off  target  by
a about  L.E. 5  billion.  Moreover,  the  corresponding  deficit  would  in itself  be
impressive  (about  23%  of  GDP,  from  about  12%  in  FY90). How  can  we,  then,  adjust
the  budget  to  meet the  "Deficit-equal-Available-Financing"  rule?
In principle,  we look for a combination  of revenue increasing/expenditure
cutting  measures  able to  raise  around  L.E.  5  billion  (by  purely  fiscal  means).
However,  further  cuts on real expenditures  (over-and-above  the ones the ones
already  included  in our starting-point  budget  for FY91)  will be politically
difficult  to convey;  they  would  both  hurt social-support  programs  (among  which
very-low-paid,  highly-inefficient,  public-sector  employment  should  be counted)
and  would  further  depress  economic  growth  (via  public  investment  cuts).  Instead,
we will assume  that the  government  will close  the  budget  gap only by revenue
measures;  namely,  L.E.  4 billion  from  higher  tax  revenue  (sale  tax,  cigarette
tax, and the like) and L.E. 1 billion  from higher  non-tax revenue (mainly,
increased  energy  prices).
Finally,  once the overall deficit  matches the (non-inflationary)  available
financing  in FY91, how should the government  proceed  in future  years?  We
introduce here  another simple rule  (which, again, should  optimally be
announced):  index  all  the  items in the  budget  by  the  previous-year  inflation
rate, except  for money financing  (which  is  to  be  kept  constant  in nominal
terms).  This  procedure  will bring  about  a (small)  gap  between  the  deficit  and
the available  financing.  Hence,  we suggest:  close  the gap arising  from the
nominal  freeze  on money  financing  by  passing-  through  an  equivalent  amount  of  the
extra  costs  associated  with  the  stabilization  program  (either  devaluation  or
interest  related  ones).  Eventually,  this  rule  will  mean  the  gradual  face  out  of
money  finance  in  real  terms,  as  well  as  will  require  a lower  real  pass-through.
In summary,  our  fiscal  prescriptions  read:
a) reduce  and  freeze  nominal  money  financing  (to  L.E.  2.3  billion);
b) freeze  real  withdrawals  from  the  social  security  system  at its
current  level  (L.E.  5.6  billion  at FY91  prices);
c) expect  a constant  nominal  dollar  foreign  financing  (at  FY91  level  of
US$ 2  billion);
d) get  your  deficit  down  to the  available  financing  (probably,  through
revenue  measures  only).
e) in  subsequent  years,  cover  the  real  dilution  in  money  financing  by an
equivalent  pass-through  of  the  initial  costs  of  the  stabilization  program.
Assuming  that  these  prescriptions  are followed,  we want to find the  resulting
time paths for inflation  and output.  We turn to this question  in the next
subsection.- 33 -
vii) Inflation  and  Output  in the  Full  Reform  Scenario:
We  have  simulated the  effect of  our  policy package and  fiscal policy
recommendations  in  the  context  of  our  model  in  order  to  quantify  their  short  and
medium  run  effects  on inflation  and  output.
As explained  before, given the fixed  nominal  exchange  and (binding-ceiling)
interest  rates, the role of inflation  becomes crucial.  Saving, investment,
trading  and other resource-allocation  decisions  will depend  on the expected
value  of inflation  (as  it  drives  ex-ante  real  exchange  and  interest  rates).  One
major piece of information  for the setting  of that value is given by the
forthcoming  monetary  expansion.
Apart from the "2.3-billion"  rule for fiscal  deficit  money financing,  three
other sources  of money creation  will be operative:  the monetization  of CBE
domestic debt  servicingX,  the  "blocked  account" system of  foreign debt
'servicing",  and the effect of exchange  rate controls.  The  last two are
particularly  important  upon  implementation  of  the  adjustment  plan  as  it  involves
a steep  devaluation  of the  domestic  currency.  As the  amount  of Egyptian  pounds
needed  to service  a given  foreign-currency  obligation  increases,  more  domestic
money  will  be  paid  into  the  blocked  account;  in  effect,  this  extra  payments  will
offset  all  the other  sources  of money  expansion  during  the first  year of the
plan (when  a 60%-plus  devaluation  will  take  place),  leaving  the  country  with  a
flat  nominal  money  base.  This  outcome  is obtained  even if  we assume  (as  we do
in  our  simulation)  that  the  country  (through  its  Central  Bank)  honors  up to  half
of  its  foreign  debt  servicing  commitments,  that  is, if  we increase  its  actual
"arrear"  factor  from  its  current,  effective  10%  to 50%.
Interestingly,  we  observe  that  the  steep  devaluation is  effectively
disinflationary.  This is,  of course,  only due  to the  particular  institutional
arrangement  concerning  the foreign  debt servicing.  If the Central  Bank fully
paid  foreign  creditors,  or  the  concerned  public  sector  companies  were  unable  to
meet their  "blocked  account"  obligations,  the  behavior  of money  and inflation
would  be quite  different.  In fact,  one should  expect  this system  not to be
sustainable  in  the  longer  run. The  idea,  however,  is  precisely  to cushion  the
Initial  inflation  impact  of the adjustment  by only partially improving  the
country's  foreign  debt  servicing  performance,  in  the  hope that  the  efficiency-
related measures of  the packages (privatization,  investment  disincentives
removal,  and the  like)  will start  having  effect  after  two  or three  years.
It  should  be  noticed  that  we are  assuming  away  other  exogenous  changes  in  money
base.  In  particular,  the  Central  Bank  is  to refrain  from  any  form  of "bail-out"
of  troubled  public  sector  companies,  both  directly  (through  opening  credit  lines
for  them)  or indirectly  (through  credit  to other  banks  which,  in  turn,  lend  to
those companies).  This discipline  will be hard to maintain,  as the reform
20/  And of any  other  institution  whose  domestic  debt is  effectively  serviced
by the  Central  Bank  of Egypt.- 34 -
program  will shake  many public  corporations  and the  calls  for  protection  will
abound. Much of the success of the program,  however, will depend on the
effective  commitment  of the  Central  Bank to its  pre-set  monetary  targets
Baring  exogenous  deviations,  our  model  predicts  an immediate  disacceleratlon  in
money  base growth.  In fact,  nominal  money  base  will stay flat  or decline  over
the three  first  years  of the  program's  implementation,  having  a sharp  fall  in
real terms during the same period (Chart  XII).  As explained  above, this
behavior  is mostly due to the liquidity-absorbing  effect  of the devaluation
through  the  blocked  account  system. Also,  our  low-money  outcome  obtains  under
a given  set of policy  parameters;  namely,  the  degree  of sterilization  of the
monetary  effects of foreign exchange  controls,  the money-vs-debt  financing
choice  at the Central  Bank itself,  and so on.  We have used values  for those
parameters  in line  with  the  observed  modus-operandi  of the  Egyptian  authorities
in recent  years;  by all means,  this  looks  very  money-biased  (See  Appendix  for
exact  figures).
In spite  of the  tight  monetary  policy,  the rate  of inflation  will  jump during
the  first  year of the  stabilization  effort  and  will,  thereof,  decline  steadily
(Chart  XIII).  The upward  pressure  will come from the several  relative  price
corrections  that  the government  will introduce  into its  array  of administered
prices (most notably, exchange and  interest  rates) as well as  from the
recession-pushed  contraction  in  real  money  demand.  As  most  of those  corrections
will take  place  during  the first  year of the reform,  inflation  in FY91 is to
increase  to around  40% (from  its  FY90 level  of 25%) even though  the  monetary
tightening  will  be at its  toughest  point  (nominal  money  base  will  hardly  change
during  FY91). This  further  highlights  the  need  for  monetary  discipline:  if the
country  gets into  its  reform  Drogram  with  no commitment  to dear  money,  it  will
risk  having  huge initial  inflation;  in the  event,  political  pressure  will  halt
the whole program (as, in the unindexed  Egyptian  economy,  real wages will
plummet).  In  other  words,  stabilization  is  a  necessary  condition  for  successful
structural  reform.  If,  instead,  the  authorities  stick  to  their  initial  policies,
our  model  predicts  a sharp  disacceleration  in inflation  over  the  following  two
fiscal  years (to  22%  and 5%  for  FY92  and  FY93,  respectively).
Given  the  inflation  results  described  above,  what  will  be the  short-and-medium
run  behavior  of output? The answer  lies  on the  policy  choice  for the  nominal
interest  rate ceilings and  for the nominal level of the  fixed (rather,
controlled)  exchange  rate.  Once  those  choices  are  made,  ceteris  paribus,  higher
expected  inflation  means  lower  expected  real  interest  rate  and  higher  domestic
absorption  growth.  Similarly,  the  higher  expected  inflation  at home  as compared
with the  world's  rate, the faster  the  appreciation  of the real exchange  rate
and,  so,  the  deeper  the  deterioration  of the  country's  trade  balance.
It should  be notice  that, in the context  of our model,  expected  and actual
inflation  rates  are  assumed  identical.  In general,  this  could  only  be true if
private  agents  were  rational  and  they  knew  the  government's  policy  package  with
certainty  (and no other exogenous  shocks  to inflation  were operative).  Our
recommendation  about  the  need to announce  (and  stick  to!)  fiscal  and  monetary
targets  is  meant  precisely  to  help the  private  sector's  formation  of inflation
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Following  our policy  package,  we will assume  that  nominal  (lending)  interest
rates  are  raised  to 25X (from  their  current  161  level)  upon implementation  of
the  plan,  and  later  reduced  (to  20 and  151 in FY92  and  FY93,  respectively)  as
inflation  slows  down.  As for  the  exchange  rate,  it  will  be unified-cum-devalued
(from  its  current  average  of 2.68  L.E./$  to  a  unique  3.6)  and  subsequently  kept
in line  with (ex-post)  inflation.
Our simulation-generated  estimate  of the  GDP's  behavior  is,  then,  as follows:
a)  In the  first year  (FY91), though nominal interest rates will be
substantially  increased  (in  our  simulation  from  16  to  301),  real  interest  rates
will remain  (deeply)  negative,  helping  r3al aggregate  demand  growth.  HP-ever,
the  steep  devaluation  of the  official  exchange  rate (about  401) will  _  more
than  offset  by  domestic  and  foreign  inflation,  keeping  the  dollar  trade  balance
unchanged.  This  latter  effect  will  be compounded  by the  strong  disacceleration
in real government  expenditure's  growth (consumption  and  investment)  and,
together,  will revert the positive effect on  aggregate demand from the
negativity  of real  interest  rates.  In the  end,  GDP  growth  will  be negative,  at
about  -2.5X.
b) In the second  year,  the disacceleration  in inflation  (from  40% to 221)
will bring the real interest  rate up to close-to-positive  values,  while the
official  exchange  rate  will  depreciate  heavily  in  real terms.  Also,  our  fiscal
rules will assure that real government  expenditure  will remain constant.
Overall,  the increase  in  real interest  rates  will  dominate,  and  our  aggregate-
demand-driven  real  output  will  remain  stagnant  (contracting  by a  full  percentage
point).
c) Finally,  in  the  third  year,  yet  lower  inflation  will  drive  real interest
rates  well  onto  the  positivity  range.  However,  the  real-terms  devaluation  of  the
official  exchange  rate  will be strong  enough  for  the  economy  to have positive
real  output  growth  (in  spite  of the  operative  freeze  in  real  government  demand);
the  latter  is  estimated  at  about  2% in  FY93.  (Chart  XIV).
viii  )  Inflation-Output  Growth  Tradeoff  in  FY91:  A Digression.
What are the possibilities  currently  open to the Government  with respect  to
short-term  inflation  and  growth? In principle,  the  authorities  could  achieve
faster  economic  growth  during  FY91  by straightforward  money-financed  expansion
of  their  own  expenditures.  This,  of  course,  will  have  important  medium  and  long-
run  consequences  on the  economy's  performance  (crowding-outs,  loss  of  monetary
credibility,  aggravated  current account positions,  loss of  any remaining
international  creditworthiness,  etc.). Still,  we have found interesting  to
analyze  the  possible  inflation-growth  combinations  that  could  be  obtained  under
an array  of money-financed  real government  expenditure's  growth  rates.  Those
combinations  are  depicted  in  Chart  XV.  Two  main comments  seem  relevant.  First,
even  at zero real  growth,  the  Egyptian  economy  is  bound  to suffer  high levels
of inflation  (over  501).  Second,  each extra  percentage  point of real growth
roughly "costs"  five percentage  points  of inflation.  It should  be noticed,
however,  that  our trade-off  (or "Phillips")  curve  is linear  (so  is the  model- 38  -
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behind  it); it should  rather  be interpreted  as a Taylor-linearization  of the
actual  function  and,  so,  as  only  valid  in  the  neighborhood  of  equilibrium  (i.e.
in the  short-run).
ix)  Summary  and  Extensions:
It is  clear  that the  public  sector  financing  requirement  is the  anchor  of the
stabilization  program  described  above,  specially  in  terms  of  money  finance.  The
overall  fiscal  deficit  is  to  adjust  (down)  to  meet  the  available  financing.  The
latter,  in  turn,  is  shown  to  be  disinflationary,  given  the  existing  arrangements
on the  foreign  debt.  As for  GDP  growth,  it  will  mainly  be driven  by the  swings
in real  interest  rates  and  by the  real  exchange  rate  devaluation.
Needless  to say,  then,  that  the  centerpiece  of  the  whole  plan is  the  government
success in cutting down the public sector deficit to the available non-
inflationary  financing  path. In  fact,  should  the  authorities  be successful  in
following  that  path,  other  pclicies  may start  looking  irrelevant  or redundant.
For instance,  the  implied  tightening  on  money  creation  may  render  the  exchange
rate controls  unnecessary,  as agents  find the  holding  of domestic-currency-
denominated  assets much more appealing  (assuming  they have confidence,  and
evidence,  that  the  government  sticks  to its  plans).  In that  sense,  our  IMF-WB-
type  policy  package  may not look comprehensive  (e.g.  it does not call for a
total  liberalization  of exchange  rates  and/or  interest  rates);  we have shown,
however,  that,  coupled  with fiscal  and  monetary  discipline,  it does  provide  a
basic  but important  set  of  policies  that  can  take  Egypt  back  to  price  stability
and  growth.
Also,  our  model  starting  values  correspond  to  end  calendar  year 1989.  The  speed
at  which  events  are  happening  both  in  the  economic  and  political  arenas  in  Egypt
is likely to quickly render our results outdated.  Baring major structural
changes,  however,  our model could  be easily  "rebased";  if any, this paper's
contribution  is precisely  to offer a framework  for short-and-medium  policy
simulation.  In the  end,  it  is  up to  the  Egyptian  authorities  to decide  whether,
when  and  how  a stabilization-cum-reform  effort  is  needed.- 41 -
Conclusions:
The  Egyptian  policy-makers  have  managed  to  run  huge  public  sector  deficits  with
relatively-low  inflation  results.  This  has  allowed  the  country  to force  itself
into  a fast  real  growth  track  which  is  independent  of the  economy's  comparative
advantages;  ever-growing  domestic  absorption  has  driven  both output  and trade
deficits. Effectively,  this  policy  has  been financed  through  the  depletion  of
the  country's  stocks  of  creditworthiness,  money  illusion  and  enforceable  foreign
exchange  controls.
Whether  that  growth  model  constitutes  a desirable  development  strategy  or  not,
depends  upon the  policy-makers'  preference  map; it is only  possible  that they
may have found  social  priorities  and rates  of return  that fully  rationalized
their  actions,  even  under  the  most  rigorous  principles  of economic  management.
However,  the assets  on which the system  is founded  (creditworthiness,  money
illusion,  enforceable  foreign  exchange  controls)  are now at the border of
disappearance,  and  no  quick  recomposition  is  feasible.  Whatever  its  past  merits,
the  existing  economic  model  is  exhausted,  and  heading  for  collapse.  A change  in
the  country's  development  strategy  is  needed.  And  this  is  true  independently  of
any  social  preference  function.
In  this  paper,  we  have  provided  a (limited)  analysis  of  the  short-and-medium  run
effects  of  one  possible  policy  approach.  Our  bottom-line  message  reads:  put  the
public  sector  to  live  inside  its  non-inflationary  means,  and  do  it  at  once.  We
realize  that  this is  an very demanding  premise:  political  and social  pressure
can  become  intolerable  under  the  adjustment  effort.
However,  we have shown  that  both the  slow-down  in  output  and the initial  rise
in  inflation  associated  with  a  tough  reform  program  will  be short  lived  (between
one and two years). In contrast,  a do-nothing  strategy  will soon push the
country  into a serious  crisis  (as  Egypt is dependent  on basic imports,  like
foodstuff),  whose  correction  will certainly  be more  painful.
There  is  no doubt,  then,  that  the  Egyptian  policy-makers  must  act immediately.
But,  we have  not yet  demonstrated  that  a simple  muddle-through  approach  could
not suffice.  In our view,  the  very nature  of the  assets  on which the  current
economic  order is based renders  that approach  ineffective.  The reasons  are
simple.  First,  Egypt  will  not  recover  its  creditworthiness  if  the  international
lending  community  (official  and  private)  does  not see  a significant  change  in
the  country's  economic  attitude;  only  tough  adjustment  efforts,  specially  in  the
public  sector  accounts,  can  convey  that  message.  Second,  it  will take  lots  of
very-conspicuous  monetary  discipline  to  convince  local  agents  to reverse  their
portfolio  allocations  into  domestic-currency  denominated  assets;  in  effect,  lost
money  illusion cannot be  recovered.  Thirdly, there is  little room for
strengthening  the  existing  foreign  exchange  controls;  in  the  end,  the  marginal
political  and financial  cost  of a tighter  grip  will outweigh  its  benefits,  as
marginal  agents  will find  forex  dealing  "too  rentable"  to  be dropped.- 42 -
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APPENIX
Model's  Eouations  and Notation
Money  Market:
(1) Money  Demand:
(Md/P),  =  r  . Yt  *  exp(-a.idt)
(2) Money  Supply:
M8 is exogenously  determined;  see below
(3) Equilibrim  in Money  Market:
(M/P)  t  =  r  . yt  . exp(-_.  idt
(4) Partial  Solution  for  Inflation  (from taking  rates  of change  in  (3)]:
=r=  (6Mt/Mt. 1)  - (6yt/yt_l)  +  C.6idt
Goods  Market  (unemDloyed  economy):
(5) Aggregate-Demand-Determined  Real  Output:
Yt =  TBt . (e/P)t +  da,- 44  -
(6)  Total Domestic Absorption:
da,  =  pat  +  gat
(7)  Private Domestic Absorption:
pat  =  T  . Yt  . eXp{-B.  (it  - Et 1 (irt)
(8) Government's Domestic Absorption:
ga, is exogenously determined in the budget
(9)  Trade Balance Growth:
. 6TBt/TBt-  )  =  n  [  gt  (-t  - 6t)  +  (1 - /At)  (fit  7rXt)]
(10)  Devaluation in "black" Forex Market  (PPP is operative):
6t  =  t  (1  +  1t  )  (1  +  w7rt)  ]  - 1
(11)  Real Output Growth [from  taking rates of growth in (5), and using (6)
-(10)]:
(SYt/Yt.1)  =  (01  n)  '  - (0 1-nl. +  02) 7rt  *1.([1+n  (l-2,A.)]  wit
- (03 .B)  [jidt  - sEt- 1 (rd)  +  02  *  G
where:  *1  =  abs(TB.e)  /  abs(TB.e  + G)
02  G  /abs(TB.e  + G)
03  A  /  abs(TB.e + G)- 45  -
Inflation Formation Mechanism:
(12)  Perfect Foresights:
Et-  1 O(rd)  =  Xt
Semi-Reduced-Form Solution of Inflation  and Real Output Growth
(13) Inflation:
T  =  ¢  *  (  (6mt/Ht.,)  - (  ,  n  At)  e*t  +  l  (l+0  (l-21t)  ]  w7r,
+  [a  + 03 B  j  6idt  +  [03  ]  t-1 +  2  G)
where  ¢  ta 1- (j1  n  at)  +  02  - (03  B)  ]-
[NB:  All right-hand-side variables in (13) are now exogenous]
(14)  Real Output Growth:
Yt/Yt-1) =  (01.n-Ad)  e  t  (1  anM  At +  2  03 B)  t
- 0 1 .[l+n(1-2,Lt)]  w?r  - (0 3 .B)  6it
A
- (03  B)  t-1 +  02  *  G
[NB: ?rt  as solved in (13)]- 46  -
Policy-Variables Determinatign:
(15)  Money Expansion:
Mt  =  t  t  (TBt.1 +  NISAt1.]  e*t  +  0t  [ NINSFDt  +  Bdt,.  i  t
+  (aB  t-1 - FAt-1)  it  et. 1 ]  - 0 Bf.  ift  e*t
(16)  Government  Debt  Expansion:
6Bt  =  (1  - 8 e)  At  t TBt.1 + NISA_ J  e*,  +  (l-0t)  t  NINSFD,  +  Bdtr i9t  +
+  (atBf t.  - FAt1)-if  ttet 1 jI
(17)  Foreign  Debt  Accummulation:
SBft  =  ( l  - at)  Bft_,  if t
(18)  CBE's  Foreign Asset Accummulation:
6FAt  =  At t TBt..  + NISAt..1 ]
(19)  Blocked  Account  Expansion:
6 BAt  =  O  B:-ift  e*t
(20)  Non-Interest Service Account Growth:
(6NISAt/NISAt. 1)  =  EXGS  +  a  (idt  _  -t  _  ift)- 47  -
,otation:
Md  =  Demand for nominal money base
P  =  Domestic price level
t  =  Time subscript
r  =  A positive constant
y  =  Real GDP
a  =  "Cagan's"  parameter
id  =  Nominal domestic interest rate for private documents
mg  =  Nominal supply of money base
M  =  Equilibrium nominal money base stock
vr  =  Domestic inflation
6  =  Change  (e.g. &xt = xt-x,1,  for any "x")
TB  =  Trade balance result (in dollars)
e  =  Free (i.e.,  black) market exchange rate (L.E. per US$)
da  =  Total, real domestic absorption
pa  =  Private, real domestic absorption
ga  =  Government's real, domestic absorption
V  =  A positive constant
a  =  "Financial  distress" parameter
Et_I0  =  Expectations at time t-1
n  =  "Marshall-Lerner" parameter
A  =  Proportion of non-interest current account (NICA)  result
surrendered at C.B.E.
a  = Devaluation of C.B.E.'s exchange rate
e  =  Devaluation of free exchange rate
w7r  =  World inflation
G  =  Government's nominal domestic absorption
An  =  Private, nominal domestic absorption
=  Proportion of Central-Bank absorbed foreign sector
result that gets monetized  (i.e.,  non-sterilized)
NISA =  Non-interest service account (Suez, tourism, workers'
remitances, etc.) (in  dollars)
NICA =  TB +  NISA
=  Proportion of total non-social-security financed
deficit that gets monetized
NINSFD= Non-interest, net of social security financing and
foreign financing fiscal deficit
Bd  =  Outstanding stock of Government's (and CBE's) domestic
debt
i9  =  Nominal, average interest rate on domestic government
debt
a  =  Arrear factor (i.e.,  proportion of foreign due interests
actually paid)
FA  =  Foreign assets of C.B.E. (in dollars)
*  =  Proportion of foreign debt held by public companies and
authorities at base year (all due interest paid into
f  blocked account)
B  =  Outstanding stock of foreign debt for which C.B.E. is
(ultimate)  payment agent- 48  -
if  =  Foreign  interest  rate
BA  =  Blocked  account
EXGS =  "Exogenous" growth in the NISA
=  Uncovered interest parity parameter
Notes:
1.  The free (i.e. black) exchange rate follows P.P.P.
2.  Uncovered interest parity parameter proxis for degree of capital
mobility.  *
3.  It is up to the policy maker to choose: NINSFD, e ,  e,  ,  *,  i9,  id,  a.
Starting and Parameter Values Used in (Final  Version of) the Simulation
A) Initial Values  (1990 - Billions of L.E. or otherwise indicated):
M  =17
Bd =  38
Bl =  51  (USS billion)
TB =  -7  (US$ billion)
NISA  =  7.5  (US$ billion)
FA =  3 (US$ billion)
y =  90.2
e*=  2.85 (L.E. per US$)
e  =  2.685  (L.E. per US$)
=  30%  per  annum
id  =  16% per  annum
i=  7.8% per annum
BA  =  15
ga  =  17.05
pa  =  93.1
B) Parameter Values:
e  =  0.9  ,  for all  t
=  0.8 ,  for all t
=  0.9 ,  for all t
ig  =  is increased to 8% in FY91 and kept constant thereafter
id =  25, 20, 15% in FY91-to-FY93, respectively
e* =  is increased to 3.60 L.E. per US$ in FY91, and kept in line with
inflation thereafter
n  =  0.2
B =  0.2
a  =  0.6- 49  -
EXGS =  3% per annum
a  - 0.25
*  - 0.87
a =  0.5 (for  all "t", as compared with effective 0.1 in FY90)PRE Working Paper Series
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